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INTRODUCTION

Common perceptions of the legislative process as practiced in the United
States Congress emphasize competition for advantage. News accounts deal
with winning and losing in the legislative arena and the tactics by which
adversaries prevail. The currently dominant academic paradigm, public choice
theory, explains the actions of legislators as motivated by the need to maximize
their individual utility,' especially their chances for reelection. 2 This implies a
competitive process with the objective of securing advantage over potential
opponents. Other theories, which find the prime sources of legislative activity
in competing notions of the public interest or in the disparate interests and
ideologies of constituents, emphasize the ways in which legislative processes
create majority agreement out of divergent views. 3 Conflict resolution through
compromise nevertheless seeks comparative advantage. The legislative
process emphasizes struggle over cooperation and nonpartisan resolution of
difference.
Yet the competition which results in legislation operates within a web of
trust. Legislators necessarily rely on others within the legislative process in

*

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 17-30 (1962) (espousing a theory

of collective choice based on individual utility).
2 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE

OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT

39 (1977) (arguing that congressional representatives calculate their activities to achieve
their primary goal of reelection).
3 Compare DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-27 (1991) (explaining legislative choices in terms of interest
group theory), with ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 18-19, 43-44
(1983) (explaining legislative choice in terms of public interest theory and criticizing
interest group theory).
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their pursuit of public and private objectives. No single legislator can enact
legislation without the help of others. As a formal matter, the legislative
process requires multiple levels of agreement. To become law a bill ordinarily
must obtain the approval, by majority vote, of one or more subcommittees and
committees of the House or the Senate; approval of the full House or Senate;
approval, by a similar process, of the other legislative house; and approval by
the President. 4 At each stage, a legislator seeking a particular result must
obtain agreement from many other participants. Agreement may spring from a
common desire to obtain the same result. Alternatively, it may involve an
exchange: the second legislator's commitment to support the legislation for the
first legislator's promise to support other legislation or to take other action. At
other times, agreement results when a legislator needs the comfort of not
standing out in recording a particular view and solicits the assurance from
other legislators that they will vote the same way. As a general matter, each
legislator relies on the promises and undertakings of others.
. Legislators do not operate in an institutional vacuum. The institutions that
frame their activities require mutual trust. As an example, consider
congressional party organization. Aggregation through party organization
enhances the power and effectiveness of the participants in achieving
legislative results. A party caucus member in effect delegates a range of tasks
and considerable discretion to the party leadership to establish legislative
priorities. The member trusts the party leadership to achieve desired results
even if the member does not agree fully with their decisions. The leaders in
turn depend on the members to provide the necessary votes to carry their
legislative program. Mutual benefit results, facilitated by trust. Trust of
course has its limits and sometimes breaks down. Thus, on occasion, through
some combination of personal ambition and dissatisfaction with existing
hierarchical arrangements, members may "revolt" and seek to change the
leadership or the rules under which it governs.
Perhaps more surprising, a similar dynamic of trust can operate across party
lines. This occurs frequently in congressional committees. By their presence
on the same committee, members evince an interest in a common subject; thus,
for example, a member rarely serves on the Agriculture Committee without a
farmer-based constituency. 5 Within the framework of the common interest
defined by committee membership, exchanges dependent on trust allow
legislators of different parties to work together to achieve specific goals.
Legislation on controversial matters brought forward with bipartisan support,
such as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill, provide evidence of cross6
party cooperation.
4 See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (prescribing bicameral approval and presentment to
the President).
5 See MAASS, supra note 3, at 66 (explaining that members of Congress choose
committee assignments according to their interests).
6 See Gephardt Questions Bush's Agenda, AP ONLINE (Washington), Jan. 21, 2001,
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The day-to-day operations of each legislative House reflect trusting
relationships. The formal rules of each House specify procedures that can
become cumbersome in practice. Each House routinely accomplishes some of
its business through unanimous consent to suspend the rules. On occasion,
however, the trusting relationship disappears and confrontation takes its place.
This may occur, for instance, when a small group of legislators determines that
it may obtain advantage by impeding the machinery of legislation. 7 The
Senate filibuster provides an example. 8 Once a delaying tactic limited to
matters of high priority to those who employed it, the filibuster now emerges
more routinely. 9 Observers take as a given that Senate passage of controversial
legislation generally requires sixty votes, the number needed to shut off debate,
rather than fifty-one, a numerical majority.' 0
Trust also permeates legislators' relationships with non-elected participants
in the legislative process. Each legislator supervises staff members who act for
the legislator and whom the legislator must rely on to act in the legislator's
interest. Staff deal regularly with the staff of other legislators, with the
representatives of economic and social interests that have business before the
Congress, and with representatives of the Executive branch. In these
interactions staff often speak for the legislator and must transmit the
legislator's views and commitments faithfully.
All of these interactions play crucial roles in the legislator's success,
however measured. In all of them the legislator relies on other parties to
provide information, to keep promises, or to take action consistent with the
legislator's needs. Yet external methods of enforcement, sanctions for bad
behavior, generally do not exist or exist only in weak forms. With rare
exceptions, the legislator cannot avail herself of the textbook remedy for legal
enforcement of promises-a lawsuit for breach of contract to obtain damages
or specific performance. An effort to seek help from the courts may prove a
political liability if it gives the member the appearance of political weakness.
available in 2001 WL 9870666 (quoting House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt for the
proposition that the McCain-Feingold bill enjoys bipartisan support in both houses of
Congress).
7 See, e.g., J. MCIVER WEATHERFORD, TRIBES ON THE HILL 230-33 (2d ed. 1985)
(describing how Senator Helms brought the legislative process to a standstill when he
offered an amendment to the act that created the Department of Education).
8 Senate Rule XXH provides an elaborate process for cloture, or shutting off debate,
which requires the votes of sixty Senators. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN.,
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-15, at 15-17 (2000) (outlining the
procedure for ending debate in the Senate).
9 See WEATHERFORD, supra note 7, at 238-39 (explaining the origin and development of
the use of the filibuster in the Senate).
10See, e.g., Nick Anderson & Janet Hook, Campaign Finance Reform Bill Gains Key
Senate Supporter, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at A16 (reporting that Senator McCain was
nearing the 60 required to ensure that his campaign finance reform bill reaches the Senate

floor).
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But even when a member could turn a lawsuit into a political asset, the
courtroom outcome likely proved disappointing. Courts generally refused
even to consider claims brought by legislators arising out of their interaction
within Congress or with the Executive. They offered a variety of reasons: lack
of ripeness,"1 lack of standing,' 2 political question doctrine,' 3 the exercise of
equitable discretion, 14 and the inability to provide a judicially enforceable
remedy. 15 The Supreme Court has now firmly shut off the avenue of judicial
review, for lack of standing.' 6 Even in the heyday of congressional lawsuits,
however, plaintiffs likely came to the courthouse door with other ends in view:
to create news and to publicize the real or fancied harm, not with any realistic
hope of a judicial remedy.17 Therefore, less formal sanctions must support the
legislator's expectation of appropriate future performance. Inevitably, these

11See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J. concurring) (dismissing
as not ripe a complaint filed by members of Congress alleging that the President had
deprived them of their constitutional roles).
12 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(per curiam) (holding inter alia that a House member did not have standing as a legislator to
challenge the legality of a proposed action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development); but see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(deciding that a Senator had standing to seek a declaratory judgment that a bill became a law

without the President's signature at the expiration of the ten-day period after presentation to
him).
13 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist J., concurring) (invoking the political
question doctrine to support the dismissal of a complaint filed by members of Congress
against the President).
"a See Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (exercising discretion to deny a remedy to members of the House of Representatives
that challenged the constitutionality of a revenue-raising bill that originated in the Senate).
An influential commentator, Judge Carl McGowan, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit,
endorsed this approach. See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15
GA. L. REV. 241, 244 (1981) (arguing that courts should not invoke justiciability grounds to
dismiss lawsuits brought by legislators, but rather should hear the cases and use their
traditional discretion to grant or withhold equitable relief to fashion the appropriate
remedy).
"5 See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (invoking separation
of powers concerns to deny relief to Republican House members alleging that the

Democratic leadership had discriminated against them in allocating committee and
subcommittee seats); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (dismissing a case challenging the constitutionality of the procedures established by
the Federal Reserve Bank on the ground that judicial action would improperly interfere with
the legislative process).
16 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813 (1997) (holding that members of Congress
lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act).
17 For example, the plaintiffs in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill may have filed their lawsuit to
increase public awareness of the Democratic leadership's perceived abuse of its majority
status.
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expectations rely on trusting. Sometimes the trust is misplaced, but perhaps
more surprising, often it is justified.
Trust in the legislative arena does not flow from altruism. It rests on two
related foundations: personal interactions and rational incentives. Legislators
must engage with each other over at least a two-year term and usually far
longer. Their encounters reflect the dynamic of continuing players rather than
one-time participants. Thus, failure to carry out commitments chills the
possibility of future advantageous agreements with the aggrieved party.
Moreover, the process of shared experience and personal interaction can create
friendships that make the foundation for trust personal as well as professional.
Further, each House of Congress has many of the characteristics of a small and
closed society. A legislator who reneges on commitments outside the bounds
permitted by that House's culture suffers a reputation loss that affects the
ability to deal with other legislators not directly affected by the particular
breach.
I. LEGISLATOR TO LEGISLATOR

Take a simple example of logrolling. Legislator A wants to include
provision X in pending bill one. Legislator B wants to include provision Yin
pending bill two. A classic example of trading votes would involve B's
promise to support inclusion of provision X in bill one in exchange for A's
promise to support inclusion of provision Y in bill two. But the two bills that
will carry these provisions will not come before the House simultaneously. If
bill one comes up for consideration first and B supports it with provision X, B
bears the risk that A will renege and fail to support provision Y later when bill
two comes to the House floor. B cannot cast A's vote on A's behalf or carry a
formally binding proxy. B's vote for X legislation rests on trust, on the
expectation that A will perform as promised.
Legislative exchange between members appears in more complex forms as
well. B may vote for A's desired legislation without demanding a specific quid
pro quo, but with the understanding that A will provide support in the future for
as yet unspecified legislation of importance to B. B in effect creates a political
credit with A on which B may draw in the future. By leaving open the exact
form of A's future performance, the parties create flexibility: B will determine
when and for what purpose to draw down the credit with A. Further, this
understanding between A and B rests on implicit conditions, as for example
that B will not request an action that would embarrass A with A's constituency.
Within the accepted bounds, A generally will comply with B's request for the
reasons stated earlier.
A recent practice has created a new way for one legislator to obligate
another to honor a future request for support. Individual legislators collect
funds for their reelection campaigns. Often, the election does not deplete the
fund, leaving a surplus. This may occur both because the member can raise
exceptionally large sums in campaign contributions and because the member
can avoid large election expenses, as when the member runs uncontested or
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against a weak opponent. The member's unspent campaign funds may carry
over to the next election cycle or the member may use some of it to support the
candidacy of a fellow legislator. 18 The legislator who contributes to the
campaign runs the risk of receiving nothing in return if the recipient loses the
election. But if the recipient wins, both the contributor and recipient
reasonably can expect the latter to express gratitude for the assistance in a
tangible way when Congress next convenes. The expression may take the
form of support for legislation, as in the earlier examples, or support for the
contributor in seeking a leadership position with the party hierarchy. 19 In
either event, the contributor trusts the recipient to repay the contribution in an
appropriate manner.
II. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

As the Constitution describes the procedure for enacting a law, the
President plays a limited role, approving or vetoing the legislation at the end of
the process, with the possibility of Congressional override even if he exercises
the veto.20 In contrast, in the United Kingdom and similar parliamentary
systems, bills originate with the Cabinet and carry a virtual guarantee of
enactment into law.21 The practice in the U.S. Congress falls between these
poles. Most significant legislation originates in the Executive branch. Each
House of Congress may make significant revisions or reject these proposals.
Representatives of Executive branch departments participate informally at each
stage of the legislative process. Inevitably, they negotiate with members as to
the content of legislation and for support for the proposal.
A member may support a legislative initiative from the Executive branch for
many different kinds of reasons. Occasionally, negotiations for support
resemble those between legislators, although the President manifestly has a
wider range of benefits to confer in exchange. Trust that the Executive will
fulfill its promises facilitates the negotiations. By all accounts, mutual distrust
between the Clinton Administration and Republican leaders in each House of
Congress contributed to their legislative gridlock in the six years after 1994.22
18 See Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 11, 2000), available in 2000 WL

21482558 (quoting Representative Marge Roukema for the proposition that members with
large "war chests" that do not have competitive primaries or general election campaigns
often raise excess funds to donate to other members).
'9 See id. (noting that Representative Roukema "may be at a disadvantage" in her quest
to become chair of the Banking Committee because she did not have excess funds to
contribute to other members of the committee).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (prescribing the bicameralism and presentment
process).
21 See Philip Norton, Public Legislation, in PARLIAMENT AND PRESSURE POLITICS 180

(Michael Rush ed. 1990) (explaining that the Cabinet initiates legislation in Great Britain).
22See, e.g., David Baumann, A Lame Duck Ending, 32 NAT'L J. 3483, 3483-84 (2000)
(quoting President Clinton and several congressional Republican leaders on their mutual
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The important role of trust and the effects of its absence appear starkly in
the process of appointment of federal judges. The formal process requires
appointment by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 23 The
President and a majority of the Senate often belong to different political
parties. Before the mid-1980s the political actors avoided through compromise
the impasse that could arise from partisan difference. Frequently, a number of
appointments came together as a package that satisfied the needs of both
parties. Each side exercised its implicit veto-presidential failure to appoint or
Senate failure to approve-with care. These institutional arrangements rested
on trust: an expectation that the other side would behave in accordance with
these norms.
This trust suffered severe damage in the defeat of Judge Robert Bork's
nomination for the Supreme Court in 1987.24 Democrats castigated Bork, a
former academic and a judge on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, as
an ideologue. The attacks in the press became personal; one zealous magazine
published a list of videotapes Bork had rented. 25 The Senate defeated the Bork
nomination, but Republicans seethed.
In turn, during the Clinton
Administration they responded with unprecedented opposition to his judicial
appointments. It remains to be seen whether nominations from the Bush
Administration will engender the trust of Democrats in a closely divided
26
Senate.
III. STAFF
Each legislator hires a significant number of staff, on average 16.5 for each
Representative and 42.7 for each Senator. 27 Staff functions range from the
clerical to the highly discretionary. As examples of the latter, legislative aides
master substantive areas for the member, advise the member on positions to
take within those areas, and negotiate with aides for other members to obtain

distrust and recounting the resulting gridlock of the lame-duck period).
23 See U.S. CONST., art. 2, § 2.
24 See ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK

NOMINATION SHOOK

AMERICA (1989), for a detailed account of the process.
25 This episode served as the impetus for the Video Privacy Protection Act, colloquially
known as the "Bork Bill." See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY

LAW 10 (1996) (describing the publication of Judge Bork's video rentals).
26 However, the nomination of former Senator John Ashcroft for Attorney General may
provide an early indication.

See Helen Dewar, A Serious Breach in Bipartisanship;

Democrats Fire a "Shot Across the Bow", WASH. POST. Feb. 2, 2001, at A6 ("By amassing
42 votes in opposition to the former Missouri senator, the Democrats sent the president a
strong warning to expect far more trouble if he again turns to the Republican Party's right
wing for other top appointments, most importantly for the Supreme Court.")
27 See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1999-2000 129

(2000) (reporting that for 1999, the House of Representatives employed 7,216 personal staff
and the Senate employed 4,272 personal staff).
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support for legislative positions. 28 The member trusts all staff to maintain
confidentiality and to refrain from compromising the member's interests.
Aides who exercise discretionary authority on the member's behalf carry the
additional obligation of any agent to act in the principal's best interests, and
the member trusts them to do so. This trust rests in part on the member's power
to fire staff for unsatisfactory performance. At the same time, the member may
reward a loyal staff member by assisting that staff member in career
advancement.
Similarly, congressional committees employ their own staff, some of whom
perform sensitive tasks requiring the exercise of discretion. These staff work
most closely with the chair and ranking minority members of the committee.
They may negotiate legislative positions, supervise the drafting of legislation,
and write committee reports. Again, their current position of authority depends
on the chair's continuing approval, and the chair also may have influence over
their career aspirations. For example, Justice Breyer's prior service with an
influential Senate Committee helped him in securing his seat on the Supreme

Court.29 Thus, tangible rewards and sanctions support the chair's trust that the
committee staff will act in the chair's best interest.
An oft-cited exchange on the floor of the Senate between Senators
Armstrong and Dole in connection with major tax legislation in 1982
illuminates the role of highly placed committee staff.30 Senator Armstrong
28

See

MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND

14-15 (1979) (discussing the role and
influence of legislative aides); Muriel Morisey Spense, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as
THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L.
congressional staff).
29

See

REV.

585, 604-08 (1994)

(describing the role of

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF STEPHEN

G.

BREYER TO BE AN

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, S. EXEC. REP. No.

(1994), reprinted in 19

103-31, at 3

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND

REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

at 831, 833 (Roy M. Mersky et al. eds.,
1996) (citing Justice Breyer's two years of service as chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary
Committee as one of his qualifications and unanimously recommending his Supreme Court
nomination).
30 See 128 Cong. Rec. 16918-19 (1982). The exchange went as follows:
Mr. ARMSTRONG: My question, which may take him by surprise, is this: Is it the
intention of the chairman that the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court and
other courts take guidance as to the intention of Congress from the committee report
which accompanies this bill?
Mr. DOLE: I would certainly hope so ....
Mr. ARMSTRONG: [W]ill the Senator tell me whether or not he wrote the committee
report?
Mr. DOLE: No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee report.
Mr. ARMSTRONG: Did any Senator write the committee report?...
Mr. DOLE: I have to check.
Mr. ARMSTRONG: Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote the committee
BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1994,
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first asked Senator Dole, chair of the Committee on Finance, whether he had
read the entire report. Senator Dole replied that he had not. Senator Armstrong
then asked whether the Committee had voted on the report. Senator Dole
replied that the Committee had not. Senator Armstrong pointed out that those
who would have to construe the new provisions would rely on the committee
report as an authoritative source of legislative intent; he then noted that the
Senators on the committee had not written, voted on, or read the report, and the
Senate could not amend the report when the legislation came up for a vote.3
Committee staff had written the report.
Although Senator Armstrong sought to de-legitimize the committee report
as a source for judicial construction of the statute, he understood that Senator
Dole had acted appropriately and in accordance with customary Senate
practice in offering the report to the Senate. 32 Senator Dole and the other
Senators on the committee had confidence that the report accurately reflected
the Senators' views in the drafting. The Committee members had discussed
and decided on the major elements of the legislation, and staff would have
sought approval from its members for any nuance within the report that
favored a particular interest.
Yet reliance on staff may inhibit other trusting relationships. More tasks
performed by staff means less direct contact between members. Furthermore,
when legislators hash out an agreement about a complex piece of legislation
through their staff, they miss the opportunity to develop the personal sense of
mutual reliance that a face-to-face meeting fosters. Often, some substantive
agreement disappears in the chain of communication as well, perhaps distorted
by the less experienced understanding some staff bring to the process.
IV. LOBBYISTS

Members of Congress maintain a complex relationship with lobbyists, one
that also involves a considerable measure of trust. For the purpose of this
report?
Mr. DOLE: I might be able to identify one, but I would have to search. I was here all
during the time it was written .... and worked carefully with the staff as they worked..
Mr. ARMSTRONG: [Hias the Senator from Kansas, the chairman of the Finance
Committee, read the committee report in its entirety?
Mr. DOLE: I am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it.
Mr. ARMSTRONG: [D]id members of the Finance Committee vote on the committee
report?
Mr. DOLE: No.
30
See id. at 16918-19 ("[Slome courts have in fact relied upon committee report language
as if it were a statute ....
[T]his is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not subject to
amendment, and we should discipline ourselves to the task of expressing congressional
intent in the statute.")
32See id. at 16918 (acknowledging that he was just putting remarks into the record and
not filing an official objection to the committee report).
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Article, a lobbyist is one whom clients pay to represent specific interests before
Congress. Generally, those interests seek to enact legislation (or to prevent the
enactment of legislation) that affects business or profits interests, such as the
oil and gas industry, television broadcasters, or an airline pilots' union. Other
organizations, whose missions address social issues such as drunk driving or
abortion, also lobby Congress.
Lobbyists seek access to members to present their client's position and to
obtain the member's support for that position. 33 They offer two major assets to
a member to gain this access and support: information and money. First,
lobbyists provide information by quickly educating a member on the substance
of a client's particular issue. Lobbyists from different sides of a contentious
question also educate the member for upcoming votes or other action. As a
related function, lobbyists provide a form of communication among parties
concerned with a particular issue. As an example, a member who seeks to
convey a preference on an issue to a regulatory agency without doing so
directly can disclose the preference to a lobbyist who, in turn, may repeat it
when meeting with staff of the agency. In a similar manner, lobbyists can help
the member to gauge the sentiment of other members on a particular matter.
Members thus rely on the accuracy of the information and communications
provided by lobbyists.
Second, lobbyists help provide money for the member's campaign fund.
Both the lobbyist and the member commit a felony if the former pays the latter
to vote in a particular way on a pending matter. 34 In some cases, however, a
high correlation exists between contributions from a particular source and
legislative action favorable to that source. Do lobbyists contribute to the
campaign funds of members who support their clients' positions, or do
members support the clients' positions because they have received campaign
contributions? Each must leave the connection sufficiently vague and must
trust the other to perform as expected.
Consider the simple arithmetic of financing a campaign for reelection.
Suppose that a contested campaign for a House seat costs $1 million, a
reasonable estimate. 35 If a member serving a two-year term begins raising the
money at once, the member must raise an average of $1,370 every single day.
A lobbyist who makes a contribution of $10,000 to the fund has performed a
33 See Spense, supra note 28, at 604-09 (discussing the role of lobbyists in the legislative
process).
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (imposing criminal liability on those who bribe a public
officials and on any public official who accepts a bribe).
35 During the 1998 election cycle, candidates for the House of Representatives spent an
average of $547,635. See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 80 (outlining the average
expenditures for a congressional candidate). However, this estimate may now be on the
conservative side. See Jean Merl, Cost of Rogan-Schiff Battle for House Seat Topped $10
Million, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at B9 (reporting that former Representative James E.
Rogan raised $6.4 million for his failed re-election bid in November 2000 and that
successful Democratic challenger Adam Schiff raised $3.9 million for the campaign).
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week's worth of fundraising for the member, a valuable service. Moreover, a
substantial fund may appear as a formidable obstacle to a potential challenger,
deterring would-be candidates from entering the fray. Thus, a lobbyist who
helps to scare off opponents has provided value. The lobbyist and the member
both know this and expect the member to respond cooperatively in the future.
In a few cases, generally those involving social rather than economic issues,
lobbying organizations can reward a member with benefits that enhance the
member's reputation and thereby improve the member's standing with
constituents and colleagues. If, for example, the Consumers Union names a
Senator as consumer advocate of the year, the organization extends part of its
own prestige to that legislator. Presumably, the organization does so after the
legislator has acted favorably on its legislative agenda and expects that the
award will bind the Senator even more firmly to that agenda.
Neither the lobbyist nor the member can compel the other to perform as
promised. But each can sanction the other in the future for failure to perform
as promised. If the member reneges, the money stops. If the lobbyist reneges,
the member may vote against the client's interest in the future. A lobbyist
develops a reputation for veracity and reliability, and failure to perform as
promised injures the lobbyist's ability to persuade other legislators to act
favorably in the future.
CONCLUSION

Trust binds many disparate elements of the legislator's work in the
Congress. It enables members to form coalitions with each other through party
organization and through shared constituent interests. Other kinds of trusting
relationships enable individual members to extend their reach through staff.
Members' relationships with lobbyists, another set of long-term players in the
legislative process, depend on mutual trust. For a contentious and partisan
body, trust provides institutional glue. But trust has limits. A member
rationally might conclude in a given instance that the benefits of breaking a
trust exceed the costs. That member might individually benefit in that instance
but does so at the expense of potential erosion of institutional reliance on trust
in the future.
Finally, trust provides only one of the elements in the operation of Congress.
Analysis of its effects provides no more complete picture of the Congress than
a map of the Metro fully describes the District of Columbia. Congress remains
a competitive institution. Yet trust contributes significantly to its operation.

